No “reasonable financial provision” after living together for 42 years

In the case of Thompson v Ragget & others [2018] an unmarried couple lived together for over 42 years prior to the testator’s death in 2017. This case is similar but less acrimonious than Martin v Williams [2017] , also regarding an unmarried couple, with the addition of an estranged spouse. Both cases involve claims for reasonable financial provision and present and interesting comparison. The case of Thompson v Ragget & others was heard in the Chancery Division of the High Court, as follows:-

Facts 

1. The claimant (C) sought reasonable financial provision following the death of her partner, the testator (T)
2. C, aged 79 years and T (in his 90s when he died) cohabited for around 42 years
3. They were so cohabiting at the time of T’s death.
4. T had left her nothing in his last Will (dated December 2016), of many, to C.
5.  T left a letter of wishes of the same date as the Will explaining why he left nothing to C
6. C who had four children from a previous relationship,
   1.  was financially dependent on T throughout their relationship
   2. worked without pay to further T’s farm and caravan site business
   3. brought a claim under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 for “reasonable financial provision” from T’s estate
7. The other defendant’s (1st, 2nd and 3rd) were the executors of T’s last Will
8. T left his net estate to the 4th and 5th defendant’s (“E and F”).

Background

In the 1970s, C and T took up residence in a farmhouse on T’s estate. Both parties developed a number of health conditions in their increasing age. In 2015, social services became concerned that the conditions of the farmhouse were not appropriate for C to live in and so she stayed temporarily in a care home. After that the parties moved into a caravan close to the farmhouse.

In 2016, T purchased a cottage on the estate with a view to moving into it with C. T passed away later that year, following which C returned to live in the care home.

T had made eleven Wills during his lifetime, the last dated 16th December 2016.

In his last will T bequeathed his net estate, valued at approximately £1.5m, to E and F.  They were tenants of one of T’s properties on his land.

In a contemporaneous letter of wishes, T explained that he had specifically made no provision for C or her children.

T’s reasoning was that “[C] has her own money and her own savings” and that C’s children had “previously taken advantage of [him]”.

In fact, C’s only assets at the time of her application were £2,500 savings and income comprised of state benefits.

Arguments

C’s position was that she would like to move back into the cottage and to live there with her son and his wife, who would provide domestic assistance.

C therefore sought:

• the outright transfer of title to the cottage into her name [note] that is, Elidyr Cottage and whether it should be transferred to her outright, or
• by virtue of a life interest with power of advancement.
• In Illot v The Blue Cross and others [2017] UKSC 17 [2017] 2 WLR 979, the Supreme Court dealt with a claim under the Act by an adult child in which it emphasised that the statutory power is to provide maintenance,
• not to confer capital.
• Lord Hughes, with whom the other Justices agreed, referred at paragraph 15 to a decision of Munby J, as he then was, in In re Myers [2005] WTLR 851, which concerned a similar claim by an adult child.
• The award was not of an outright capital sum but of a life interest together with power of advancement designed to cater for the possibility of care expenses in advanced old age.[/note];
• a capital sum for renovations;
• a capital sum for moving costs, and;
• a capitalised sum to represent the on-going cost of running the cottage.

C relied on evidence from her GP which suggested that it was in her best interests to live in her own home as opposed to a nursing home.

She also relied on the expert evidence of an occupational therapist who was of the opinion that C could live adequately with assistance from her son and her daughter-in-law.

E and F conceded that T had not made reasonable provision for C in his last Will. However, they argued that C’s claim harboured two inherent preconditions:

1. that the evidence of C’s GP was correct and up-to-date, and;
2. that C’s son and daughter-in-law would actually provide the care suggested.

The judge determined that both preconditions were met.

E and F argued that C should merely be provided with a life interest in the cottage, rather than an outright transfer.

Award

The Trial Judge considered T’s former obligations to C and to E and F respectively.

The Judge concluded that T had assumed little if any responsibility towards E and F.

Conversely, the judge found that T himself had acknowledged his financial responsibility towards C by having made provision for her in a former Will and the accompanying letters of wishes.

The fact that T did not want his assets to fall into the hands of C’s children was not sufficient reason for having left C without financial provision.

Given the duration of cohabitation, and the fact that C’s son and daughter-in-law would live in the property to care for C, the judge ordered the transfer of the cottage to C outright.

The judge also ordered the payment of £28,844 by way of a lump sum in respect of renovations and moving costs, and a capitalised sum of £160,000 for the on-going cost of living.